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Global Cyber Intermediary
Liability: A Legal & Cultural
Strategy
Jason H. Peterson,* Lydia Segal,**
and Anthony Eonas***
I.

Introduction

Cybercrime is one of the most serious problems facing
modern economies around the world.1 In the United States
alone cybercrime cost an estimated $9 billion in 2011.2 In
Germany, it cost about $6 billion that year.3
Reformers have poured a great deal of effort into trying to
figure out what to do about the problem.4 Scholars have written
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1. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2012 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: UNITED
STATES 1-2 (2012), http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2012_US_Cost_of
_Cyber_Crime_Study_FINAL6%20.pdf; see also Charlotte Decker, Cybercrime
2.0: An Argument to Update the United States Criminal Code to Reflect the
Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (2008).
2. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2; see also Sara Yin, Cyber
Crime Costs Jump 56 Percent, PC MAG. (Aug. 3, 2011, 2:45 PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2390371,00.asp.
3. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Distributed Security:
Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659 (2005);
Decker, supra note 1, at 963; Salil K. Mehra, Law and Cybercrime in the
United States Today, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 659 (2010); Michael Edmund O'Neill,
Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
237 (2000); Meiring de Villiers, Enabling Technologies of Cyber Crime: Why
Lawyers Need to Understand It, 11 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 4 (2011);
Jonathan B. Wolf, War Games Meets the Internet: Chasing 21st Century
Cybercriminals with Old Laws and Little Money, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95 (2000).
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about it extensively and put forth multiple proposals for
change.5 So far, however, little seems to be making a dent.6 In
fact, cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent, more vicious,
and more expensive every year.7
One reason for the lack of an effective solution may be that
scholars and experts are focused almost entirely on
cybercriminals and the countries that support their crimes.8
They seem to be largely ignoring the critical role played by
intermediaries, which include both Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and hosts, in facilitating cybercrime.9 ISPs provide the
actual gateway for users to the Internet, while hosts provide
server space to users.10 Some intermediaries provide both
functions.11 A search of law reviews reveals no recent articles
considering policy changes geared towards ISP liability as
means to combat cybercrime and a complete disregard for the
role of hosts.
On the one hand, this lack of attention to ISPs and failure
to spotlight their strategic relationships to hosts are
astonishing because hosts and ISPs provide the means and
venue for cybercriminals to operate. On the other hand, the
lack of attention is understandable because hosts and ISPs
operate in a virtual no-man’s land in terms of laws, legislation,
and even national jurisdiction.12 This is in spite of the

5. See sources cited supra note 4.
6. See Decker, supra note 1, at 961-62.
7. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2; see also Yin, supra note 2
(discussing the challenge of determining the cost of cybercrime). The median
annual cost of cybercrime for organizations in 2011 was $5.9 million, which
represented a 56 percent annual increase. Yin, supra note 2. The components
of loss include: (1) intellectual property; (2) direct financial; (3) sensitive
information; (4) opportunity costs; (5) recovery costs; and (6) reputation. Id.;
see also Decker, supra note 1, at 963 (noting cybercrime results in billions of
annual losses).
8. See sources cited supra note 4.
9. See id.
10. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 256 (2005); see also Ctr.
for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613-15 (E.D. Pa.
2004).
11. See Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 613-15; Mann & Belzley, supra note
10, at 256.
12. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 10, at 244.
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important regulatory function ISPs play online.13
This Article fills the gap in the debate on fighting
cybercrime. It considers the role of intermediaries and the legal
and cultural strategies that countries may adopt. Part II.A of
this Article examines the critical role of intermediaries in
cybercrime. It shows that the intermediaries’ active
participation by facilitating the transmission of cybercrime
traffic removes a significant barrier for individual perpetrators.
Part II.B offers a brief overview of legal efforts to combat
cybercrime, and examines the legal liability of intermediaries
in both the civil and criminal context and in varying legal
regimes with an emphasis on ISPs. Aside from some level of
injunctive relief, intermediaries operate in a largely
unregulated environment. Part III looks at what we can learn
from other countries. The cleanest intermediary country,
Finland, and the worst country, Lithuania, were selected in
order to explore the causes for the differences between country
performances. The section examines the remarkable
distinctions between national cultures to explain differences in
national cybercrime rates.
Part III.A of this Article argues that the criminal code laws
do not account for the difference in host and ISP performances
between Finland and Lithuania. There are few differences in
the codified laws pertaining to cybercrime between these
countries. Instead, it is Finland’s cultural and business
environments that appear to drive its cybercrime ranking. Part
IV suggests reforms to shift a country’s culture to make it less
prone to corruption. However, changing a culture takes time so
Part IV also proposes a private law scheme in which
intermediaries are unable to wave the “flag of immunity,” as
they do now. The guiding philosophy for this proposal is that
harmed parties should be permitted to recover damages
directly from “bad” intermediaries.

13. See Sandra Braman & Stephanie Lynch, Advantage ISP: Terms of
Service as Media Law, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS 249, 250-51
(Lorrie Faith Cranor & Steven S. Wildman eds., 2003).

3

2014] GLOBAL CYBER INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY

589

II. Intermediaries
A. Intermediaries and Cybercriminals
Cybercriminals do not operate within a vacuum.14 The
Internet’s framework consists of a handful of intermediaries,
each with its own relationship with the cybercriminal.15 For
example, an individual who creates and releases a Trojan in
Lithuania relies upon a handful of participants.16 Figure 1
provides a simplified view of the relationships of several
intermediaries, including registration companies, hosting
companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Registration
companies provide website domain names to Internet users.17
Hosting firms sell server space and provide IP addresses to
those who wish to access the Internet.18 ISPs provide the actual
gateway to the Internet for the Lithuanian perpetrator.19
14. See de Villiers, supra note 4, at 16-17.
15. Id. at 16.
16. A Trojan is a form of malware that discretely convinces users that it
is a harmless computer program. See Jon Brodkin, Viruses, Trojans, and
Worms, Oh My: The Basics on Malware, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2013, 9:00
AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/viruses-trojans-and-worms-ohmy-the-basics-on-malware. The results range from harmless pop-up windows
to extensive damage to the operator’s computer often providing a gateway to
infiltrate the user’s computer or network. Id. Today, hackers are more likely
to be large-scale corporate entities than single perpetrators thereby providing
substantial leverage in the online market. See John Loveland et al., Be
Afraid, Be Very Afraid: The Rise of Organized Cyber Crime, CORP.
COMPLIANCE
&
ETHICS
INST.
(2010),
available
at
http://discover.pli.edu/Details/Details?start=0&rows=50&sort=s_title%20asc
&fq=~2B~title_id~3A282B22~23683~2229202B~id~3A282B22~23683CH44~2229~&facet=true&qt=legal_boolean.
17. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 61315 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
18. See INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS
(ICANN), http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars (last visited Oct. 25,
2013).
19. See generally Braman & Lynch, supra note 13, at 249. The ISP
industry has seen tremendous growth through the 2000s. Id. at 252. This is
largely due to diminishing startup costs and the explosive growth of the
Internet. Id. There are means by which ISPs may be distinguished from one
another including geographic region, the services offered, and its fit within
the architecture of the Internet including whether it is downstream or
upstream, the types of content it packs and whether its services include web
hosting. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3

4

590

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

Figure 1
The Internet

Registration
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1.

The Connection between Malware and Intermediaries

Malware is the most common form of cybercrime and
therefore represents the most prevalent means in which
cybercriminals interact with intermediaries.20 Malware has
three primary forms.21 First, a virus reproduces as it spreads
across computers deleting and stealing data as it travels.22
Executable files deliver the virus, which remains dormant until
the end user opens the file and triggers the virus.23 Second,
20. Cybercrime According to the Experts, 19 NEXT WAVE 60, 60 (2012),
http://www.nsa.gov/research/tnw/tnw192/articles/pdfs/TNW192_article10.pdf.
21. See Brodkin, supra note 16.
22. See id. But see Mann & Belzley, supra note 10, at 241 (noting less of
a need to hold intermediaries responsible in the area of viruses, spam,
phishing, and hacking because of the perceived inability to control the
content and because of the market incentive of ISPs to provide a clean
network).
23. See Brodkin, supra note 16. File sharing and email attachments

5
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worms are similar except that they do not rely upon other files,
thus, they are often able to spread across vast computer
networks.24 Finally, trojans convince users that they are
harmless computer programs.25 The results range from
harmless pop-up windows to extensive damage to the
operator’s computer.26 Trojans often provide a means for users
to infiltrate the host’s computer or network.27
Not only does malware attack computers but it also creates
“botnets.” These are large networks of “zombie” computers that
may be harmless to the computer operator but may respond to
commands at the cybercriminal’s discretion from a controlling
server.28 Criminals who establish botnets frequently rent
access to the infected network to other criminals who
“monetize” the access.29 The Russian Business Network (RBN)
provides an apt example of a host and the release of a botnet.30
RBN provides the portal for numerous activities and collects
“infrastructure fees” that result from the fraud.31 In 2007, RBN
was responsible for releasing the BOTnet “storm” that
controlled between 1 million and 50 million computers.32
Clients would then pay RBN for unfettered access to a portion
of the computers.33

often spread the virus. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. Remote Access Trojans are “beefed up” backdoors that
contain a user interface permitting the attacker to issue destructive
commands. See id. Commentators occasionally refer to malware as a
“backdoor” as it bypasses firewalls and executes an object connecting users to
the perpetrator’s workstation and corresponding network files. See id.
“Information stealers” often misappropriate information through the use of
keystroke recording devices known as “key loggers.” See id. “Ransomware” on
the other hand holds a user hostage until the user compensates the
perpetrator to restore the computer. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Loveland et al., supra note 16.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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The Regulatory Landscape of the Internet

One symptom of the fact that no one is focusing on the role
of intermediaries in cybercrime is that these entities operate in
a virtual regulatory no-man’s land. The Internet itself is highly
decentralized.34 Its open, virtually lawless architecture was
originally designed in a small community that had a high
degree of trust.35 The point was to keep the Internet as free
from regulation as possible in order to foster an unfettered
exchange of information. At the time, cybercrime was unlikely
to be considered a major problem. To the extent that
cybercrime was considered a major problem, the assumption
was that the marketplace would clear it up through selfregulation.36
Although the self-regulatory model above is probably the
most closely accurate description of how the Internet actually
functions today, three other models suggest that there may be
alternative, informal or unofficial, ways to regulate the
Internet. These models are: (1) neo-mercantilist; (2) culturalist;
and (3) globalism.37 The neo-mercantilist model suggests that
the government intervenes occasionally to police cybercrime to
ensure the free flow of commerce within the channels of the
Internet.38 This policing mostly concerns cybercriminals, not
intermediaries.
The culturalist model emphasizes the protection offered by
the local culture within its regulatory structure.39 For example,
in the United States, although there are no laws specifically
designed to hold intermediaries liable for the crimes they

34. See CircleID Reporter, Who Runs the Internet? ICANN Attempts to
Clarify the Answer with This Map, CIRCLEID (Mar. 6, 2013, 9:46 AM),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130306_who_runs_the_internet_icann_attem
pts_to_clarify_answer_with_map/. The multiple stakeholders include society,
the private sector, governments, research groups, and NGOs. See id.
35. See Roderic Broadhurst, Developments in the Global Law
Enforcement of Cyber-Crime, 29 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 408,
409, 412 (2006).
36. See Kevin A. Meehan, The Continuing Conundrum of International
Internet Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 353 (2008).
37. Id.
38. See id. at 354.
39. See id.
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facilitate, there is a culture wherein prosecutors sometimes
make use of a handful of other laws to combat cybercrime.
These laws include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act40, the
CAN-SPAM Act41, the Electronic Communications, the Privacy
Act42, the Lanham Act43, and the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations Act.44 The necessity of proving mens
rea, however, renders these laws largely ineffective as applied
to intermediaries.45
Finally, the globalism model suggests that there is some
incipient Internet regulation in the form of international
cooperation and agreements such as the Convention on
Cybercrime (the Convention).46 Hardly any of these
international agreements discuss host and ISP liability. The
Convention merely defines a service provider as “any public or
private entity that provides a service via the computer or any
entity that stores data for such an online service.”47 The
Convention says nothing about imposing liability.48
While the neo-mercantilist, culturalist, and globalism
models each describe a small part of existing Internet
regulation, there is very little regulation as a whole. To the
extent that the Internet is regulated at all, its governance is in
the hands of a grab-bag of organizations representing divergent
stakeholder perspectives.49 Because many of these stakeholders
have different interests, it is questionable whether this multistakeholder approach can operate efficiently.50 Developing
countries, for example, argue that they are underrepresented
in Internet governance and that an international organization,
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2012).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10 (discussing mens rea).
46. See Meehan, supra note 36, at 355; see also Nancy E. Marion, The
Council of Europe’s Cyber Crime Treaty: An Exercise in Symbolic Legislation,
4 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701 (2010).
47. Marion, supra note 46, at 705.
48. See id. at 705-06.
49. See Bevil Wooding, The Brewing Internet Governance Storm,
CIRCLEID (Aug. 30, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20120830_
the_brewing_internet_governance_storm/.
50. See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
should expand its regulatory oversight.51 Most observers would
probably agree that the large number of regulatory bodies and
lack of any single one with overriding authority has in large
part failed to keep the Internet safe. That is why there may be
a shift to increasing the international agreements described in
the globalism model, as evidenced by the Convention.52
Perhaps the most impressive global initiative to regulate
the Internet came in 1997, when the forty-seven nations that
comprise the Council of Europe commissioned the formation of
a comprehensive set of laws to combat cybercrime.53 The
Convention became effective in July 2004 after Lithuania
ratified it in March of that year.54 Twenty-three countries have
51. See id. Telecommunications companies are largely dissatisfied with
current Internet governance. They feel that they invested in the
infrastructure of the Internet and now, compared to the fortunes realized by
Google, Skype and Facebook, are being left behind. See id.
52. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text (discussing the
Convention). However, this decentralized system enhances governance
flexibility and has led to the amazing growth of the Internet. See Wooding,
supra note 49. One centralized entity that governs the Internet is the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is a
private organization that manages IP addresses and domain names. See
BRIGID GRAUMAN, CYBER-SECURITY: THE VEXED QUESTION OF GLOBAL RULES,
AN INDEPENDENT REPORT ON CYBER-PREPAREDNESS AROUND THE WORLD 29
(2012), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-sda-cyber-security.pdf.
The legislative and executive branches of the United States government have
cautioned against too much control within a multi-stakeholder Internet
governance model. See Rebecca MacKinnon, The United Nations and the
Internet:
It’s
Complicated,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(Aug.
8,
2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/08/the_united_nations_and_the
_internet_it_s_complicated. However, because cybercrime crosses national
boundaries, multilateral efforts are a critical deterrent. John Sinden, Jr.,
Cybersecurity at the International Level, EASTWEST INST. (April 30, 2012),
www.ewi.info/cybersecutiry-international-level. The organizations devoted to
fighting cybercrime include the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA), and the Computer Emergency
Response Pre-configuration Team (CERT-EU). See id.
53. See Marion, supra note 46, at 701.
54. See LORENZO VALERI ET AL., HANDBOOK OF LEGAL PROCEDURES OF
COMPUTER AND NETWORK MISUSE IN EU COUNTRIES 18 n.2 (2006). While the
Convention provides a comprehensive framework, its value is largely
symbolic and may not be effective otherwise. See Marion, supra note 46, at
701. One criticism is that even as more countries ratify the Convention, some
countries will provide a safe haven for cyber criminals. See id. Symbolic
legislation does perform the function of “moral educative function” by
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since ratified the Convention; the United States Senate did so
in 2006.55 The Convention provided the framework under
which signatory countries developed their respective laws to
combat cybercrime.56 The Convention provides three primary
offenses: (1) Article 2 governs the illegal accessing of
information; (2) Article 5 governs system interference; and (3)
Article 4 governs data interference.57 Intermediary liability,
however, is unlikely because of the Convention’s demand that
all criminal offenses be committed intentionally—and
intermediaries naturally assert that they are unaware of the
criminal activity on their networks.58
The laws of each ratifying country had to meet the
Convention’s minimum threshold. For example, under Article 2
of the Convention,
[e]ach Party shall adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish
as criminal offences under its domestic law,
when committed intentionally, the access to the
whole or any part of a computer system without
right. A Party may require that the offence be
committed by infringing security measures, with
the intent of obtaining computer data or other
dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer
system that is connected to another computer
system.59
Country specific laws must satisfy this provision although

educating people of what is right and wrong behavior. See id. at 706. It
further provides guidance to those countries considering a regulatory
framework. See id.
55. See Marion, supra note 46, at 702.
56. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 40916.
57. Id. at 4-5; see also VALERI ET AL., supra note 54, at 18. This is just a
minimum threshold as countries are free to codify more stringent
requirements. See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 56, at 4-5.
58. Cedric J. Magnin, The 2001 Council of Europe Convention on CyberCrime: An Efficient Tool to Fight Crime in Cyber-Space? 55 (June 2001)
(unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, Santa Clara University) (on file with
author).
59. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 56, at 4.
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some countries have “opted out” of Convention provisions.60
The Convention largely mirrors corresponding provisions
in the European Council Framework Decision on Attacks
against Information Systems (Framework Decision).61 The
Framework Decision provides the baseline for furthering
awareness of Cybercrime through the application of
meaningful assistance through the cooperation of the judicial
system and other domestic authorities.62 Both the Convention
and the Framework Decision share provisions, including those
that pertain to aiding and abetting and the liability of legal
persons.63
At least one commentator has incorrectly asserted that the
Convention does not exempt ISPs from criminal liability for the
content of third parties based upon the aiding and abetting
provision.64 That suggestion is unfounded, as the Convention is
clear that it does not require ISPs to monitor content.65
Liability would only attach under Article 11 for aiding and
abetting if the ISP shared the mental state with the
perpetrator.66 The standard for aiding and abetting “requires
the defendant to have (1) substantially assisted another who
committed a violation of international law and (2) known that
his actions would assist in the illegal or wrongful activity at the
time he provided the assistance.”67 Further, Article 12,
governing corporate liability, only attaches if an individual
with a high degree of authority violates Article 2, 4, or 5 or if a
lack of supervision results in an individual perpetrating a
crime to benefit the corporation.68
60. See, e.g., Treaty Office, List of Declarations Made with Respect to
Treaty No. 185, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last updated
Mar. 17, 2014).
61. See VALERI ET AL., supra note 54, at 18.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 23. Both the Convention and the Framework Decision
require that criminal offences be “punishable by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty.” Id.
64. See Magnin, supra note 58, at 63.
65. See id. at 64.
66. See id.
67. Anne Cheung & Rolf H. Weber, Internet Governance and the
Responsibility of Internet Service Providers, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 403, 470 (2008).
68. See Magnin, supra note 58, at 65.
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B. Intermediary Liability
Intermediaries face few repercussions for the activity on
their servers and networks, and therefore have little incentive
to monitor criminal traffic.69 The burning question, therefore, is
whether regulatory policies should impose indirect liability on
intermediaries for activities in which knowledge is difficult to
prove.70 To date, intermediaries such as ISPs have avoided
liability despite the fact that they are in a favorable position to
monitor and control cybercrime.71
In fact, ISPs wield an almost regulatory function online
and thereby operate in an environment of control without
liability.72 This regulatory function is bolstered by the

69. See NOAH SHACHTMAN, BROOKINGS INST., PIRATES OF THE ISPS:
TACTICS FOR TURNING ONLINE CROOKS INTO INTERNATIONAL PARIAHS 3 (2011).
70. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers
Accountable 8 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 217, 2004) (noting indirect liability arises in those instances in
which a party is held liable for the wrongs of another).
71. See id. at 4.
72. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 3. Ten out of 5,000 ISPs account
for around thirty percent of spam worldwide. See id. But see BRUCE A.
LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 116 (1995) (“[I]t is . . . virtually impossible
for operators of large systems to contemporaneously review every message
transmitted or file uploaded.”). ISPs, however, wield power in the amount of
information they control and retain. See Cheung & Weber, supra note 67, at
403-04 (comparing ISPs to “secret police” and “surveillance centers”). In the
context of offensive speech, authorities often seek to hold intermediaries such
as ISPs liable even absent any knowledge of the content of the speech. See id.
at 408-09. Therefore, the government has enlisted the services of these
intermediaries to monitor the content of the speech even if the intermediary
is from a country with different norms concerning protected speech. See id. at
409. The result has been an over filtering of legitimate speech in order to
capture the intended speech as mandated by the government. See id. at 40910. Not only are ISPs encouraged to censor speech, but they are also policing
the Internet by informing governments of suspected content violations. See
id. at 412. Critics have noted that ISPs perform a regulatory function even
though they do not satisfy the “regulatory criterion of being allencompassing.” Braman & Lynch, supra note 13, at 253. Further, they do not
answer to constituents in a democratic society. See id. at 267. For example,
ISPs have claimed that they are merely information distributors and not
content providers while they have claimed control over the intellectual
property they transmit. See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3

12

598

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

cooperation between the government and ISPs.73 For example,
the provisions of the Convention mandated communication
between ISPs and law enforcement.74 Further, both Canada
and China have relied upon ISPs as informers as well.75 In the
United States, the Court in American Council on Education v.
FCC held that the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement could require ISPs to provide better and more
reliable infrastructure to conduct surveillance on behalf of law
enforcement.76 Despite this leverage and power, ISPs rarely
self-regulate criminal activity on their networks.77
Asserting indirect liability over ISPs is appropriate both
because of the better position of ISPs as detectors of nefarious
activities and because ISPs are better able to internalize
negative externalities.78 Indirect liability also becomes more
attractive when the liable party has an increased ability to
influence or prevent “bad” behavior.79 The vast regulatory
control of ISPs illustrates this point.80 Simple distinctions
between ISPs and individual perpetrators further suggest their
better position to absorb liability.81 For example, ISPs tend to
maintain a static location and have “deeper pockets” compared
to individual perpetrators.82 In the context of cybercrime, the
perpetrators are largely outside the reach of the law.83 This is
true for two reasons. First, the nature of cybercrime conceals
the perpetrator and permits the perpetrator to time the attack
in order to hide his identity and location.84 Second, the
perpetrators often lack the financial resources to compensate

73. See Cheung & Weber, supra note 67, at 404.
74. See Marion, supra note 46, at 704-05.
75. See Cheung & Weber, supra note 67, at 412-16.
76. Am. Council on Educ. V. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
77. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 18. For example, the ISP for the
notoriously bad host Mc-Colo did not remove Mc-Colo from its network until
journalists gathered and presented substantial evidence of its behavior. See
id.
78. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 22-23.
79. See id. at 18.
80. See id. at 18-20.
81. See id. at 15-16.
82. See id. at 15.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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the injured parties.85 Harmed parties may be too far removed
from judgment-proof perpetrators.86
Not surprisingly, there are several market-based
challenges for ISPs to monitor their networks. ISP profit
margins may suffer if they get overly aggressive monitoring
online activity.87 Further, victims may be on a network far
removed from the ISP such that the ISP may lack the incentive
to police content.88 Finally, ISPs may only voluntarily absorb
the costs of maintaining a clean network when the cost of nonresponsiveness is high. For example, a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDOS) attack—which results in an expansive overload
of traffic on the network—may prompt a swift reaction by
ISPs.89
One noted problem with instituting a penalty on ISPs for
criminal activity on their networks is that a fine or other
penalty may discourage ISPs from actively investigating
suspicious activity, such as turning a blind eye to the content
makes it easier to assert a lack of knowledge.90 Indirect liability
imposed on ISPs may also discourage users from engaging in
“self-help” through virus software updates and the
maintenance of firewalls.91 Moreover, further active
development of virus software and prophylactic technology

85. See id.
86. See id. at 15-16, 22-23.
87. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 20. There are also economic
concerns related to the online marketplace. See Lichtman & Posner, supra
note 70, at 23. Indirect liability will raise the prices to service accounts
because of the increased legal liability. See id. As a result, select customers
may not be able to participate in the market. See id. This concern increases
when participants within the market prefer the inclusion of customers in the
online marketplace. See id. The effect of this externality might be limited
because the subscriber can often internalize the effect by offering the
customer product discounts, and other incentives. See id. Cybercriminals,
who stand to make significant income from crime are likely to make
extensive use of their hosts/ISPs, thus constituting a significant portion of
those the ISP’s/host’s traffic and profits. See Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo &
Russell G. Smith, Criminal Exploitation of Online Systems by Organised
Crime Groups, 3 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 37, 37 (2008).
88. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 20.
89. See id.
90. See id. Alternatively, several have proposed a cleanup fund
subsidized by the government and software companies. See id.
91. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 26-27.
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might also be reduced.92
There is a well-developed body of case and statutory law in
the United States that shields ISPs from civil liability.
Traditionally, those ISPs who facilitate the distribution of
communication which could lead to a common law wrong (e.g.
defamation) would have been immune from liability, so long as
they had no knowledge of the act itself. For example, early on,
courts did not hold ISPs liable for the communication of
defamatory statements through its equipment if they were a
passive distributor compared to a publisher.93 However,
subsequent decisions classified ISPs as publishers whenever
they actively manipulated editorial content.94 This resulted in a
reluctance to filter content under the guise that the court
would be less likely to view it as a publisher.95 Subsequently, in
Zeran v. American Online, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)
equally immunized both publishers and distributors.96 Section
230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.”97 This provision has uniformly shielded ISPs from
liability.
Another example of a United States court declining to hold
an ISP liable for third party content arose in Doe v. GTE
92. See id.
93. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 136 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
94. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710,
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
95. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 34.
96. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997).
Some have argued that the language of Section 230 was interpreted contrary
to its plain language. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 36. But see
Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Ex-Bengals Cheerleader Scores Win in Internet
Defamation
Suit,
LAW360
(July
11,
2013,
7:06
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/456738/ex-bengals-cheerleader-scores-win-ininternet-defamation-suit (reporting recent jury decision attaching liability to
the website TheDirty.com for the untrue statements concerning the sex life a
Cincinnati Bengals cheerleader in the National Football League). The judge
denied protection under the CDA because the website “encouraged
development of what is offensive about the content of TheDirty.com website.”
Rodriquez, supra note 96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
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Corp.98 In Doe, college athletes sued GTE Corporation and
Genuity Corporation after the two companies used their web
hosting services on behalf of several production companies for
the sale of the videos of the unclothed athletes in locker
rooms.99 The athletes claimed that the defendants had aided
and abetted the production companies in providing web hosting
services
for
activity
that
violated
the
Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.100 The court declined to
extend the application of the Act beyond the perpetrators
noting that federal courts rarely find secondary liability absent
a clear articulation of liability.101 Further, the court found that
defendants were indifferent to the content they hosted and did
not intend to promote the wrongdoing of the production
companies.102
Doe and Zeran addressed defamation and privacy
concerns, but there was little change in the court’s analysis
when the court considered ISP liability in the context of
malware. An unanswered question after Zeran was whether
malicious code disseminated by ISPs amounted to information
under the CDA. In Green v. America Online, Green sued
America Online (“AOL”) because a hacker sent a program over
the AOL network that disrupted Green’s computer.103 The court
held that AOL was immune because attaching liability would
amount to treating AOL as the publisher of the program.104
Interestingly, the court disagreed with the plaintiff that the

98. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 656.
100. Id. at 658. The district court’s motion to dismiss relied partly on the
CDA, which preempts state or local law but not the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act. See id. The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act provides that
any person who—(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication; (b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or
procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic,
mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication . . . [may
face civil liability].
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
101. Doe, 347 F.3d at 658.
102. Id. at 659.
103. Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 2002).
104. Id. at 470-71.
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harmful computer program was not “information” under the
CDA thereby leaving the liability question perhaps
unresolved.105
In the United States, the law could treat ISPs as carriers,
publishers, or distributors with each classification influencing
different levels of potential liability.106 The carrier classification
attaches little liability, as once again, the mens rea element is
critical.107 For example, the federal child pornography act has
included “knowingly” as the mens rea term for each of the
offenses pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252.108 The carrier
interpretation is consistent with the laws of both the United
Kingdom and Germany.109 While not entirely clear, Finland,
Japan, and Latvia, likely interpret the mens rea element in the
same manner.110
A publisher classification, on the other hand, would attach
a high degree of culpability.111 For example, Sweden appears to
apply a strict liability standard on publishers in radio and
television for offences related to public order, child
pornography, and unauthorized depictions of violence.112
Finally, a distributor is less likely to face liability compared to
a publisher even though the two are difficult to distinguish.113
Control, is often the cited factor in making the determination,
the greater the control of the content the more likely the law is
to consider the ISP a publisher.
One apparent shortcoming in the penalty structure applied
105. Id. at 471.
106. See Mark Tantum, Internet Crimes: Legal Responsibility of Internet
Service Providers, in 14 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 383, 383-86 (1998). Privacy
concerns in the postal and telecommunications context limit the analogy
because “legislatures have generally adopted the view that postal and
communications carriers should only be prosecuted for the carriage of illegal
information if they know the nature of the information that they are
carrying.” Id. at 384. ISPs operate in a liability regime that consists of
negligence, strict liability, or immunity. See Braman & Lynch, supra note 13,
at 254.
107. See Tantum, supra note 106, at 384.
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012).
109. See Tantum, supra note 106, at 384.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 385.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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to intermediaries under United States law is that the remedy is
often equitable, thereby providing little disincentive. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may seek to
shut down “bad” ISPs.114 The FTC has authority under the
Federal Trade Commission Act to prevent unfair and deceptive
acts or practices and may seek either injunctive or equitable
relief.115 In 2009, for instance, the FTC shut down Pricewert,
an ISP incorporated in Oregon with corporate officials outside
of the United States.116 The FTC argued that “Pricewert
[r]ecruits and [w]illingly [d]istributes [i]llegal, [m]alicious and
[h]armful [c]ontent” and that it was “fully aware” that it was
hosting the content.117 The FTC further contended that
Pricewert was “collud[ing] with its criminal clientele in several
areas, including the maintenance and deployment of
botnets.”118 Despite these allegations, the FTC merely shut
down the ISP. Those damaged by the harmful content never
recovered.
More recently, in 2012, Microsoft sued the perpetrators of
the Zeus botnets.119 In connection with the lawsuit, legal
officials raided several hosts that were associated the
defendants after Microsoft had conducted an extensive
investigation.120 The remedy sought was merely an injunction
ordering the isolation of the content and material associated
with the botnet.121 Once again, there was no recovery on behalf
of the harmed parties.122
Aside from the United States, a handful of countries have
114. See Complaint at 1, FTC v. Pricewert LLC, 2009 WL 2749865 (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 2009) (No. 509-CV-02407).
115. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 45(a), 53(b) (2012).
116. See FTC v. Pricewert LLC, No. C-09-2407, 2009 WL 1689598, at *1
(N.D. Cal. June 15, 2009).
117. Complaint at 3, FTC v. Pricewert LLC, 2009 WL 2749865.
118. Id. at 4.
119. See Motion for Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction,
Microsoft Corp. v. Does, No. 12-CV-1335, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2012).
120. See Jim Finkle, Microsoft Seizes Servers in Zeus Cyberfraud,
REUTERS
(March
26,
2012,
3:46
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/net-us-cyberfraudidUSBRE82P0ZD20120326..
121. See Motion for Default Judgment and Permanent Injunciton, supra,
note 119.
122. Id..
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considered the emerging problem of regulating intermediaries,
but little reform has resulted. For example, Nigeria, a country
rife with cybercrime, has considered extending regulatory
oversight over intermediaries including ISPs.123 One study in
Nigeria found that “[t]here is [a] significant relationship
between the awareness of [I]nternet intermediary liabilities
and level of misconducts over the Internet in Nigeria.”124 The
study further found that ISPs in Nigeria provide little security
against cybercrime.125 Despite these findings, little has
changed in Nigeria.126
A form of self-regulation, however, appears to have had
some effect in Australia. There, the Internet Industry
Association developed a voluntary code (icode) in which ISPs
identify and inform customers of attacks.127 More than ninety
percent of Australian ISPs have committed to icode.128 Under
icode, if the ISP shows that malware has infected the user’s
computer, the user is redirected to the icode homepage where
self-help tools are available to clean the computer.129 It is a
relatively new program and its effectiveness has yet to bear
out.
III. What Can We Learn from Other Countries?
Finland v. Lithuania
To explore what can be learned from other countries, the
worst-performing country (in terms of “bad” intermediaries),
Lithuania, and the best-performing country (in terms of “good”
intermediaries), Finland, were selected.130 The report classifies
123. See O.B. Longe et al., Internet Service Providers and Cybercrime in
Nigeria–Balancing Services and ICT Development, INTERNET GOVERNANCE
FORUM SECRETARIAT (2008), http://lawlibraryarchive.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/
ref/collection/p15430coll3/id/146.
124. Id. at 9.
125. See id. at 9-10.
126. See id.
127. ICODE, http://icode.net.au/home-why.php / (last visited Oct. 16,
2013).
128. See Hamish Barwick, IIA Seeks Input into iCode Review from ISPs,
Security Vendors, COMPUTERWORLD (April 3, 2012, 12:15 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/420418/iia_seeks_input_into_icode_
review_from_isps_security_vendors.
129. See id.
130. See GLOBAL SECURITY REPORT, HOSTEXPLOIT’S WORLDWIDE
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hosts, registrars, and ISPs as intermediaries and ranks the
corresponding “malicious activity” by country.131 Lithuania is
ranked number one with the highest level of malicious activity
of all reported countries, while Finland is ranked number 219
with the lowest level.132 The United States is ranked number
11.133
The gap between high performing Finland and poor
performing Lithuania presents an opportunity to examine what
factors contribute to the difference.. Do the public laws of
Finland or Lithuania account for the difference in country
performance? Do cultural factors? What can countries do to
become more like Finland and less like Lithuania in terms of
intermediary cybercrime?
A. Legal Environment
In Lithuania and Finland, law enforcement applies the
terms of the Convention as adopted in both countries.134 In
Lithuania, the Ministry of the Interior controls the Police
Department.135 On October 1, 2001, the Lithuanian Criminal
Police Bureau established a special Cybercrime Unit that
monitors, detects, and prevents violations of the Convention.136
Similarly, in Finland, the police enforce the Convention
through a dedicated computer crime squad.137 This national
unit resides between the Police Department of the Interior and
the local police.138 Suspected computer related crimes are
generally reported to the local police and communicated by the

CYBERCRIME SERIES 4 (2012) (comparing countries’ levels of intermediary
cybercrime).
131. See id. The report concedes that the country of registration for an
Autonomous System does not always reflect where the Autonomous System
resides. The report includes a secondary measure referencing the physical
location of the infrastructure determined from the routing locations. See id.
at 8.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 9.
134. See VALERI ET AL., supra note 54, at 90, 166-67.
135. See id. at 167.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 98.
138. See id.
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police to the computer crime squad.139 Several other reporting
mechanisms facilitate the communication of suspected
cybercrime in Finland. The Finnish Communications
Regulatory Authority includes the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT-FI) which receives suspected security
incidents from telecommunications operators and publishes
them online.140 Further, the Council for Mass Media publishes
decisions that are followed by subscribing organizations.141
Finland and Lithuania also have similar criminal codes
pertaining to cybercrime. Both countries are signatories to the
Convention, so the cybercrime laws in each country mirror one
another. Table 1 highlights both the provisions in the
Convention pertaining to cybercrime and the corresponding
laws in Lithuania and Finland.142 Also included are provisions
pertaining to aiding and abetting and corporate liability.143
Finland’s laws contain more provisions about cybercrime
than Lithuania’s.144 However, both countries’ cybercrime laws
contain similar content. For example, Article 3 of the
Convention is encoded in Article 198 of Lithuanian law and
three separate provisions in Finnish Law.145 All of these
provisions proscribe the intentional interception of nonpublic
computer data,146 but they only apply to the primary
perpetrator; they do not address intermediaries.
B. Cultural Distinctions
Differences in Finland, Lithuania, and the United States’
laws cannot explain their differing levels of host and ISP
cybercrime. In countries where corruption is systemic and
endemic, people often lack short-term incentives to change
their behavior.147 So even if a country has codified laws
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 98-99.
See id. at 99.
See id.
See infra Table 1.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein & Jan Teorell, Why Anticorruption
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prohibiting corrupt behaviors, those behaviors may persist
because corruption is also a function of other key variables
such as culture, history, the degree to which and length of time
the country has been democratically governed, and the
countries’ overall level of systemic corruption. It is to these
variables that we now turn in explaining the differences
between Finland and Lithuania while referencing the United
States.
1. Cultural Differences Between Nations
Countries differ in terms of their cultures – their shared
values, norms, and attitudes.148 These differences affect
people’s propensity to engage in a host of behaviors, including
corruption and cybercrime.149 Geert Hofstede, a pioneer in the
study of cultural differences between peoples, proposed a
theory of how various dimensions of a nation’s culture affect
the behaviors of people. 150 Two of these dimensions – power
distance and masculinity/femininity – seem to explain
differences in host and ISP performance between Finland,
Lithuania, and the United States.151
Power Distance (PD) measures the degree to which people
accept that power is unequally distributed in their culture.152
The higher a nation’s PD score, the more its people accept
unequal power distribution and the more comfortable they are
with autocracy, paternalism, and top down hierarchy.153 The
more accepting a culture is of PD, the more likely it is to

Reforms Fail–Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem, 26
GOVERNANCE 449 (2013).
148. See Geert Hofstede et al., Measuring Organizational Cultures: A
Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across Twenty Cases, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
286 (1990).
149. See Sheheryar Banuri & Catherin Eckel, Experiments in Culture
and Corruption: A Review 11 (The World Bank Dev. Research Group,
Working Paper No. 6064, 2012).
150. See Hofstede et al., supra note 148, at 286.
151. See id. at 288.
152. See National Cultural Dimensions, HOFSTEDE CENTRE, http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter
HOFSTEDE CENTRE].
153. See id.
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tolerate unfairness, injustice, and corruption.154 PD scores
appear to correlate with intermediary corruption and
cybercrime. For example, Finland, which has a low PD score of
33, and Lithuania, which has a high PD score of 45.155 The U.S.
is in the middle, with a PD score of 40, which also reflects its
level of cybercrime between Finland and Lithuania.156
Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity dimension is also useful
in explaining differences between Finland and Lithuania. A
masculine society is driven by competition, self-centeredness,
and individual success, with success defined by the “winner.” 157
A feminine society puts a premium on caring for others.158 It is
a society where one’s quality of life signals success, modesty is
prized, and standing out from the group is not regarded as
admirable.159 Finland, with a score of 26, is the most feminine
society of the three.160 Lithuania, with a score of 65, is the most
masculine.161 The United States, with a score of 62, is in the
middle.162 This conforms to the expectation that in feminine
societies, where people are more concerned about the welfare of
others, people are more likely to be outraged by corruption and
any situation where one person acts selfishly to the detriment
of others, than in masculine societies. In fact, high levels of
perceived corruption are correlated with masculinity.163
154. See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country
Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 278-79 (2003);
Bryan W. Husted, Wealth, Culture, and Corruption, 30 J. INT’L BUS. STUD.
339, 343-44 (1999).
155. See infra Table 2; see also Adura I. Mockaitis, A Cross-Cultural
Study of Leadership Attitudes in Three Baltic Sea Region Countries, 1 INT’L J.
LEADERSHIP
STUD.
44,
46
(2005),
http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/publications/ijls/new/vol1iss1/mockaitis/cro
ss_cultural.pdf.
156. See infra Table 2.
157. See HOFSTEDE CENTRE, supra note 152.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See infra Table 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Rajib Sanyal, Determinants of Bribery in International
Business: The Cultural and Economic Factors, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 139, 142
(2005); see also Husted, supra note 154, at 339; Christopher J. Robertson &
Andrew Watson, Corruption and Change: The Impact of Foreign Direct
Investment, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 385, 389-92 (2004).
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2. The Cultural Legacy of Communism Versus Democracy
A legacy of democracy or communism also seems to be a
factor in determining a country’s level of corruption. Research
shows that former communist countries, such as Lithuania, are
more vulnerable to corruption than nations that were never
communist.164 Researchers speculate that it is because
communist countries had strong “survival” orientations, which
have been linked in studies to higher levels of corruption.165
Studies also support the flip-side: the longer a country’s
exposure to democracy, the less corrupt it is likely to be.166
Lithuania was a communist republic of the former Soviet
Union from 1940 until 1990.167 As with many former
communist states, the transition to democracy and a market
economy has not overcome the survivalist mentality and
culture of corruption.168 The process of privatization simply
created new opportunities for corruption.169
Finland and the United States, on the other hand, were
never communist or under the Soviet Union. In fact, during the
Russian Revolution, Finland defiantly declared independence
from Russia, prompting a civil war in which the pro-Bolsheviks
were defeated.170 Finland became a democratic presidential
republic in 1919, with its citizens strongly encouraged to own
land and participate in the market economy.171
The United States, which declared independence in 1776,
has been a democracy for the longest of the three countries.
164. See Wayne Sandholtz & Rein Taagepera, Corruption, Culture, and
Communism, 15 INT’L REV. SOC. 109, 110 (2005).
165. See id. at 126.
166. See generally Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A CrossNational Study, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 399 (2000).
167. CIA,
Lithuania,
WORLD
FACT
BOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lh.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2013).
168. See Sandholtz & Taagepera, supra note 164, at 109-10.
169. See id. at 110.
170. See Markus Jäntti et al., Growth and Equity in Finland 3-5 (World
Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper 2006/06), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/4773831118673432908/Janti_Saari_and_Vartiainen_Growth_and_Equity_in_Finlan
d.pdf.
171. Id.
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(Finland didn’t give birth to democracy until 1919).172
Curiously, however, despite the United States being the oldest
democracy, it falls between Finland and Lithuania in terms of
cybercrime levels.173
One possible explanation is that the United States has
only been a full democracy since 1870, when the Constitution
was amended to give African Americans the right to vote with
the Fifteenth Amendment.174 However, this right was not fully
realized for many African Americans until the Voting Rights
Act in 1965.175 Women’s right to vote in the United States was
not added to the Constitution until the 19th Amendment, which
was passed in 1920.176 Finland, in contrast, granted suffrage to
all citizens in 1919.177
Another possible explanation is that the quality of
democracy may be higher in Finland than the United States.
Surveys show that Finnish citizens feel that they have more
voice in selecting their government, a higher level of freedom of
expression and association, and a freer media than American
citizens do.178
3. Level of Concern About Integrity, Business Climate,
Rule of Law, and Judicial Independence
A number of other cultural variables are also useful in
explaining differences between the countries. Consider, for
172. Id.;
CIA,
United
States,
WORLD
FACT
BOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2013).
173. See GLOBAL SECURITY REPORT, supra note 130, at 9.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see also The Fight for Women's Suffrage
(History
Channel
broadcast
2013),
available
at
http://www.history.com/topics/the-fight-for-womens-suffrage.
177. See Jäntti et al., supra note 170, at 6-9.
178. Finland scores a 1.54; the US a 1.16; and Lithuania a 0.90 on
Transparency International’s “Voice and Accountability” surveys. See Voice
and
Accountability,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/country (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). These
surveys capture the public’s perceptions of the extent to which their country's
citizens can participate in choosing their government, expressing themselves
freely, associating freely, and how free the media is.
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instance, concerns about integrity. Extrapolating from the
levels of perceived corruption in the three countries, it is
plausible to conclude that a culture of corruption and lack of
concern about values is most endemic and widespread in
Lithuania and least so in Finland. According to Transparency
International, (the premier institution that maps global
corruption rates) in 2013 Lithuania rates a low 54 out of 100 in
corruption;179 Finland, a high 90 out of 100; while the US falls
in the middle with a 73 out of 100. 180 Transparency
International also reports that Lithuania is the worst at
controlling corruption, with a score of 0.32; Finland is the best
at controlling corruption, with a score of 2.15; while the United
States is in the middle, with a 1.23.181 This correlates precisely
with the host and ISP cybercrime rates in these countries.
Other reports and surveys support the conclusion that
Lithuania has the most corruption-prone culture, while
Finland has the least. The culture of corruption in Lithuania,
and its infiltration in the country’s upper echelons, for
instance, is illuminated in the numerous high-profile cases of
government abuse there. Cases involve officers ranging from
city mayors, top national minister, upper level officers in the
important Ministry of Economy, the Postal Service, the State
Social Insurance Fund, and to the speaker of Parliament .182
179. See Corruption Perception Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/#myAnchor2 (last visited Nov. 24,
2013).
180. See infra Table 4. It is notable that Transparency International
rated Finland as the least corrupt country in 2012. Id.
181. See id. According to Transparency International control of
corruption is one of six dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicators. Id.
182. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG,
http://www.btiproject.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20
Lithuania.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). Vilius Navickas, the mayor of
Vilnius, was forced to resign in 2010 because he had exerted pressure on the
auditor of the municipal administration to resign for pursuing investigations
about the construction of schools and the effectiveness of central heating in
Vilnius. See id. at 8. The economic minister failed to declare his private
interests in accordance with procedures and has been forced to resign. See id.
In early 2011, the Prosecutor’s General Office charged three high-ranking
officials of the Ministry of Economy for a number of corrupt acts. See id.
High-ranking employees of Lithuania’s postal service and state social
insurance fund were recently charged with corruption and the abuse of office.
See id. There was a trial against Viktoras Muntianas, the former speaker of
the parliament, who resigned in March 2008 amid allegations that he bribed
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Moreover, reports suggest that the number of criminal acts
related to corruption are on the rise.183
Reports show that Finland, in contrast, is relatively free
from the serious, systemic kind of corruption that afflicts
Lithuania.184 The Finnish population takes ethical values,
honesty, and legal codes very seriously —that trend that has
increased over the past ten years.185
Finland’s concern with values is reflected in its proactively
ethical corporate culture and ethically oriented corporate
governance practices, including Internet companies.186 Finnish
corporate governance is characterized by a high degree of selfregulation, resulting in companies often imposing sanctions on
one another.187 Transparency tends to permeate firms, as
suggested by the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act
requirement that institutions explain departures from
shareholder recommendations.188 Not surprisingly, Finnish
ISPs are known to “self-police” suspicious cybercrime activity,
regardless of whether they have a legal obligation to do so.189
TeliaSonera, a Finnish ISP, for instance, began an automated
review system for its network in 1999.190 It is now fully
automated and frequently updated.191 All this suggests that

a deputy governor of Kaunas County to receive assistance for a relative’s
business. See id.
183. See id. The latest available data by the Lithuanian Ministry of
Interior shows an increase in the number of criminal acts related to
corruption. See id. In 2009, 890 such cases were registered, which is up 23%
since 2008 (724). Id. A total of 479 persons were registered as suspects in
corrupt activities, which is 10% more than those registered in 2008 (435). Id.
It is not known whether this increase is a result of improvements to the fight
against corruption or a rise in corrupt activities. See id.
184. See Ari Salminen, Olli-Pekka Viinamäki & Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka,
The Control of Corruption in Finland, 9 ADMINISTRATIE SI MGMT. PUB. 81, 8183 (2007) (Fin.).
185. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, supra note 182.
186. See DATAMONITOR, COUNTRY ANALYSIS REPORT-FINLAND–IN-DEPTH
PESTLE INSIGHTS (2009).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Mirko Zorz, Behind the Scenes of the Cleanest ISP in the World,
HELP
NET
SEC.
(Apr.
17,
2012),
http://www.netsecurity.org/article.php?id=1703.
190. See id.
191. See id.
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improving the quality of service – rather than merely meeting
the minimal threshold of legal obligations—is what drives most
ISPs in Finland.192
Unlike in Finland, we found no evidence of significant
corporate transparency, corporate self-policing or any
requirement that institutions explain departures from
shareholder recommendations in the Lithuania. Needless to
say, there is no evidence of ISPs self-policing in Lithuania.
The United States record on ethical corporate governance
is somewhere between Lithuania and Finland. The passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 improved, corporate
transparency.193 However, corporate transparency is still
problematic.194 In a few, but far from all, industries, American
corporations should be commended for self-regulation.195
United States firms tend not to impose sanctions on each other,
as they do in Finland. Nor are United States firms obligated to
explain departures from shareholder recommendations.196 A
number of American ISPs have agreed to self-police in certain
areas, such as piracy.197 However, many have not.198 Corporate
governance is a reflection of societal culture and therefore
192. See id.
193. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see
also Greg Zegarowski, Corporate Sustainability After Sarbanes-Oxley Linking
Social-Political Initiatives and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
Resources, 4 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 52 (2007).
194. See, e.g., Tessa Hebb, The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension
Fund Investors’ Corporate Transparency Concerns, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 385, 385
(2006).
195. See Robert Greenwald, News Corp: A Study in the Failure of
Corporate Self-Regulation, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/26/newscorporation-joel-klein; see also Lisa L. Sharma, Stephen P. Teret & Kelly D.
Brownell, The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to Promote
Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240
(2010).
196. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); see also SEC DIV. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF
REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND
ELECTION
OF
DIRECTORS
(2003),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyrpt.htm.
197. See Ernesto Van Der Sar, Has Your ISP Joined the US “Six Strikes”
Anti-Piracy
Scheme?,
TORRENTFREAK
(Aug.
3,
2012),
https://torrentfreak.com/isp-six-strikes-anti-piracy-scheme-120803/.
198. Id.
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different countries manifest different corporate governance
practices. Finland is the least corrupt country, Lithuania is the
most corrupt and the United States is in between.
There are two other sub-facets of a country’s culture that
correlate with its overall levels of corruption: level of judicial
independence and the degree to which the country has a rule of
law.199 Both of these variables are related to the public trust in
government, which correlates with the country’s level of
integrity.200 According to Transparency International, in
Lithuania, the rule of law is the weakest of all three
countries.201 In Finland, the rule of law is the strongest (one of
the strongest in the world) and in the United States the rule of
law is in the middle.202
According to Transparency International, with a score of
6.4, Finland ranks highest in judicial independence.203
Lithuania, with a score of 3.4, ranks lowest.204 The United
States is in the middle with a score of 4.9.205 These results are
borne out by other reports that show that in Finland, judges
are professionally selected and public trust in the judiciary is
199. See
Judicial
Independence,
Transparency
Int’l,
http://www.transparency.org/country (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). Judicial
Independence is an indicator in the Global Competitiveness Index produced
by the World Economic Forum. See generally WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE
GLOBAL
COMPETITIVENESS
REPORT
12-13
(2013-2014),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_201314.pdf. It measures the perceived extent to which the judiciary of the country
is independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms.
See Judicial Independence, supra note 199. Rule of Law captures perceptions
to the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. See
id. Rule of Law is one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance
Indicators. See id. Both Judicial Independence and Rule of Law are reported
by Transparency International. See id.
200. See Eric M. Uslaner, Trust and Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Johann Graf Lambsdorff et al. eds., 2004).
Higher levels of public trust yield correlate with lower levels of corruption.
See id.
201. See infra Table 4.
202. See id. In Lithuania, there are no or few constraints on the basic
functions involved in the separation of powers, especially mutual checks and
balances. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, supra note 182.
203. See infra Table 5.
204. See id.
205. See id.
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high.206 In Lithuania, judges are not professionally selected and
public trust in the judiciary is low;207 only 20 percent of
Lithuanian citizens trust the courts.208 Therefore, it is these
countries’ cultural dimensions, more than their laws, that best
explain differences in their levels of host and ISP cybercrime.
IV. Recommendations
There are two areas in which recommendations may assist
countries such as Lithuania: cultural reforms and legal
reforms.
A. Proposals for Cultural Reform
Research suggests that it is possible for a people’s culture
to change and become less vulnerable to corruption.209 There
are examples of cities, such as Hong Kong, which changed from
having a culture that accepted corruption as a way of business
to one that did not, and of countries whose people became less
tolerant of wrongdoing.210 Many factors are involved in such
transformations, some of which stem from the cultural
variables outlined earlier.
206. See How Europeans Trust Courts and Police, ECON. & SOC.
RESEARCH COUNCIL (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.esrc.ac.uk/news-andevents/features-casestudies/features/19793/how-europeans-trust-courts-andpolice.aspx.
207. See infra Table 5.
208. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, supra note 182 (According
to a public opinion poll by Baltijos Tyrimai, only 20% of Lithuania’s citizens
trust the courts and 71% do not, 19% and 41% respectively in 2008.).
209. See Robert Klitgaard, President & Univ. Professor, Claremont
Graduate Univ., Speech at the Second Session of the Conference of State
Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Anti-Corruption: A
Holistic Approach to the Fight Against Corruption (Jan. 29, 2008); see also
Benny Pollack & Ann Matear, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Corruption in
Chile, 25 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 371 (1996).
210. See LOCAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS: WORLD CITIES FIGHTING CORRUPTION
AND SAFEGUARDING INTEGRITY (Leo Huberts, Frank Anechiarico & Frédérique
Six eds., 2008) (discussing how cities have successfully dealt with corruption);
see also Alexander E.M. Hess & Michael Sauter, The Most Corrupt Countries
in
the
World,
USA
TODAY
(July
14,
2013,
7:02
AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/14/most-corruptcountries/2512785/.
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1. Enhancing Democratic Institutions
There is a connection between the length of time a country
has been a democracy, having a communist legacy, and
corruption as discussed above. Given that connection, it would
be logical to expect that reforms that enhance democracy would
lower corruption in the long term, including cybercrime. There
is vast literature on democracy building that outlines how the
international community can help build and strengthen
democratic institutions and improve a country’s level of trust,
such as through controlled foreign direct investment and
encouraging fiscal transparency and freedom of the press.211
2. Civil Society
A key element to stabilizing democracy and enhancing
trust between people in a country involves supporting its civil
society, the sphere of non-government organizations in which
citizens voluntarily associate to share and advance common
interests.212 These organizations generally include voluntary
associations and non-profits organizations such as religious
institutions, clubs, social movements, networks, and other

211. See PETER BURNELL, BUILDING BETTER DEMOCRACIES: WHY
POLITICAL
PARTIES
MATTER
(2004),
http://www.wfd.org/upload/docs/WFDBBD5_noprice.pdf; see also John C.
Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger & Justin M. Grimes, Using ICTs to Create a Culture of
Transparency: E-government and Social Media as Openness and AntiCorruption Tools for Societies, 27 GOV’T INFO. Q. 264 (2010); Ivar Kolstad &
Arne Wiig, Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich
Countries?, 37 WORLD DEV. 521 (2009); Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh,
Causes of Corruption: A Survey of Cross-Country Analyses and Extended
Results, 9 ECON. GOVERNANCE 245 (2008) (discussing the importance of
newspapers to lower corruption levels); Robertson & Watson, supra note 163,
at 385.
212. See Pellegrini & Gerlagh, supra note 211, at 245 (finding that
medium-long exposure to uninterrupted democracy is associated with lower
corruption levels); see also Axel Hadenius & Fredrik Uggla, Making Civil
Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can States and
Donors Do?, 24 WORLD DEV. 1621 (1996) (discussing the importance of a
vigorous civil society for democratic stability and performance); Vilmos F.
Misangy, Gary R. Weaver & Heather Elms, Ending Corruption: The Interplay
Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and Institutional Entrepreneurs, 33
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 750 (2008).
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informal groups.213 It is through these organizations that
people exercise the freedom to come together and give voice to
their individual and collective wishes, dreams, and
expectations, share their interests, express their values and
preferences, and build trust in each other.214 This kind of civic
engagement can help fight corruption.215 Reform initiatives
should thus support countries’ civil society organizations to
strengthen the underlying civic participatory infrastructure –
the vehicle through which trust can grow and democracies
develop.216
3. Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law
Reformers should also design methods to strengthen
judicial independence and the rule of law – two indicators of a
country’s democratic vitality,217 the level of public trust in its
courts and justice system, and its overall corruption levels.218
There is a great deal of literature on how to build and bolster
these institutions. 219
4. Power Distance
We might expect that, as democratic institutions develop,
people would be increasingly less comfortable with power being
213. Non-Governmental Organizations, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW,
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=23 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013)
214. See Nicholas Babchuk & John N. Edwards, Voluntary Associations
and the Integration Hypothesis, 35 SOC. INQUIRY 149 (1965).
215. See Frank Anechiarico, Administrative Culture and Civil Society: A
Comparative Perspective, 30 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 13 (1998).
216. See UNITED NATIONS ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR W. ASIA, ENHANCING
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC POLICY PROCESSES (2005),
http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/sdd-10-tp1.pdf.
217. See Hon. John M. Walker, Jr. & Daniel J.T. Schuker, Strengthening
Judicial Independence in the New Constitutional Democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 43 (2012).
218. See Daniel Lederman, Norman V. Loayza, & Rodrigo R. Soares,
Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter, 17 ECON. & POL.
1, 1 (2005).
219. See e.g., PIPPA NORRIS, DRIVING DEMOCRACY: DO POWER-SHARING
INSTITUTIONS WORK? (2008); Stefan Wolff, Building Democratic States After
Conflict: Institutional Design Revisited, 12 INT’L STUD.ZZ REV. 128 (2010).
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unequally distributed. If so, the country’s PD would decline,
which is associated with lower levels of corruption. This effect
might be achieved through educational initiatives that teach
students about the value of democracy and equality of
opportunity.
5. Masculinity/femininity
As discussed earlier, the more feminine the culture, the
less corrupt. The traditional understanding is that the number
and quality of institutions that engage in caring for others in a
society is an expression of the people’s level of empathy and
compassion in that society.220 However, the logic set forth by
scholars Shadnam and Thomas—that integrity flows, not only
from communities of individuals to organizations, but also from
organizations back to communities of individuals—suggests
that if reformers increase the number and quality of empathic
institutions in a society, that could make its people more caring
in the long-run too. 221 If so, reformers should not neglect
interventions that create institutions that serve others with
compassion in a country.
6. Law Enforcement
Lastly, improving the policing of corruption and
cybercrime and enhancing the penalties for those who engage
in wrongdoing can change a culture of corruption.222 Enhancing
law enforcement can change a culture, not only through
deterrence, but also by signaling that society strongly values
220. See Kees van den Bos et al., The Psychology of Voice and
Performance Capabilities in Masculine and Feminine Cultures and Contexts,
99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 638, 639 (2010); Warren French &
Alexander Weis, An Ethics of Care or an Ethics of Justice, 27 J. BUS. ETHICS
125, 126-27 (2000).
221. See Masoud Shadnam & Thomas B. Lawrence, Understanding
Widespread Misconduct in Organizations: An Institutional Theory of Moral
Collapse, 21 BUS. ETHICS Q. 379, 381 (2011).
222. See Catherine D. Marcum, George E. Higgins & Richard
Tewksbury, Doing Time for Cyber Crime: An Examination of the Correlates of
Sentence Length in the United States, 5 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 825, 833
(2011).
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honest and integrity. 223 While there will always be scofflaws, it
is the predominant signals that society consistently and
repeatedly sends that affect the culture most.224 Being serious
about prosecuting wrongdoing is one of the key ways to
demonstrate this.
B. Proposal for Legal Reform
Changing a society’s culture, however, takes time.225 So
until a cultural shift occurs, legal reform that deals with the
short-term is in order. Imposing liability on intermediaries is a
key strategy for improvement. While this recommendation
would apply to individual countries, collectively they would
have a global impact.226
The recommended liability scheme modeled below consists
of several layers of coordination between the government and
those who have been victimized by cybercrime.227 First, a
regulatory body, such as the Cybercrime Unit within the
Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau, could publish an updated
list of most nefarious hosts, those most closely aligned with
cybercriminals.228 The hosts would then have the opportunity
223. See generally ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS:
CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 3-7 (1975).
224. See LYDIA G. SEGAL, BATTLING CORRUPTION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (2004); see generally Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel,
Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic
Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007); Petter Langseth, Prevention:
An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption, GLOBAL PROGRAM AGAINST
CORRUPTION
CONF.
(1999),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp2.pdf;
Marie
Talec,
Comparative Law: Of the Impact of Legal Systems on Corruption – A
Comparative Study of France and Finland, ACADEMIA.EDU 15,
http://www.academia.edu/835544/Of_the_impact_of_legal_systems_on_corrup
tion_-_Comparative_study_of_France_and_Finland (last visited Oct. 18,
2013).
225. See DANIEL CHIROT, HOW SOCIETIES CHANGE (SAGE Publications
2011).
226. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 30; see also Tomer
Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political
Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REV. 795, 826-27
(2009).
227. See Broadhurst, supra note 35, at 416 (noting the need for
cooperation between law enforcement and private citizens).
228. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 24. Regulators could apply the
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to remove themselves from the list within a specified period
through remedial action.229 Those remaining on the list would
be subject to governmental fines.230 Next, the affiliated ISP
could be subjected to both regulatory fines imposed by the
government and independent private rights of action by victims
of cybercrime on the ISPs network if it does not discontinue its
relationship with the host.231 Figure 2 represents a schematic
of the liability scheme.
Figure 2

Criminal
Penalties

Government

Fines &
Reports

Primary
Perpetrators

Hosting
Firms

Harmed
Individuals

Internet
Service
Providers

Civil
Recovery

There are a number of benefits to this model. First, it
imposes liability on the static and well-funded ISP that also
plays the part of a pseudo online regulator.232 As noted above,
absent liability on behalf of ISPs harmed parties are often left
methodology in the Host Exploit reports for instance. See GLOBAL SECURITY
REPORT, supra note 130.
229. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 24.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 70-86.
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without a remedy as they hunt individual perpetrators and
underfunded hosts.233 Further, it removes the hurdle of
imposing a knowledge element on behalf of ISPs. ISPs would,
therefore, have a legal duty to monitor the list of “bad” hosts.234
Second, the scheme incorporates the culpability of hosts.235
The host would be front and center on published reports and
subjected to fines.236 Admittedly, locating and tracking shifty
hosts will present a challenge to regulatory bodies and the fines
may only have a minor effect.237 However, it is the relationship
with the ISPs that will create the greatest deterrent as hosts
remaining on the list will be unable to find ISPs willing to work
with them.238
Third, an important component of the scheme is that it
limits the government’s involvement by relying on private
parties to initiate lawsuits against ISPs. Norms are formed on
networks and those norms are enforced in several manners.239
It may take its form in public enforcement with not only
criminal liability but also tort liability.240 Thus, not only do
domestic criminal codes and international agreements play a
role in deterring cybercrime so too does private law.241 There is
an inherent lack of incentive structure in public law schemes

233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. (discussing quasi regulatory function of ISPs); see also
SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 23 (noting criticism of the scheme that ignores
culpability of hosts).
236. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 23
237. See id.
238. See generally SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 23.
239. See Amitai Aviram, Network Responses to Network Threats: The
Evolution into Private Cybersecurity Associations, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF CYBERSECURITY 143,143 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006).
240. See id. at 145. Alternatively, norms may be enforced through
private legal systems which arise when norms are enforced by nongovernmental institutions. See id. For example, parties could enter into a
private contract that would thereby assign rights privately but would rely
upon the court systems to enforce those rights. See id.
241. See Broadhurst, supra note 35, at 412. “[T]he role of public-private
police partnerships in the market-place and the emergence of civil society on
the Internet combined with public awareness has become essential to contain
cyber-crime amongst ordinary users.” Id. at 413. The Convention
contemplates a framework of cooperation between “private police” and NGOs
to successfully fill the gaps within the sovereign state system. See id. at 414.
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because it often inserts uninformed government officials into
the economy.242 Further, governments often decline to pursue
the hackers because of either a lack of resources or because the
state is providing some support for its activities.243 This is
particularly true in countries such as Lithuania where
corruption is more prevalent.244 Furthermore, to the extent
that intermediaries are being shut down now, it is often the
result of investigations by the private community.245 Here,
harmed parties have direct recourse against ISPs.
V. Conclusion
Fighting cybercrime has proven to be a daunting task. This
Article highlights new avenues to tackle the problem by
focusing on how hosts and ISPs can be corralled into the fight
against cybercrime. The Article proposes legal reforms that
impose liability in a manner designed to have an effective
impact while preventing ISPs or hosts from going out of
business. It also proposes societal reforms to shift the culture
and business environment to be less tolerant of corruption and
more ethically proactive. These reform initiatives will require a
great deal of effort and commitment from members of the
international community in addition to domestic efforts.
However difficult, these reforms and efforts are essential to
securing a safe and reliable Internet.

242. See Juan Javier del Granado, The Genius of Roman Law From a
Law and Economics Perspective, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 301, 302 (2011)
(“Private law as a system of incentives and a means of communication allows
people with information to make decisions and people with incentives to take
action in the economy.”).
243. See Loveland et al., supra note 16.
244. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement,
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1974)
(contending that there would be less incentive to bribe thereby diminishing
the deterrent effect if private enforcers were compensated via the phones
collected from offenders).
245. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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Table 1—Convention Provisions246
Article 2 –
Illegal
Access

Article 3 –
Illegal
Interception

Convention
[Each party
country shall
adopt domestic
laws] when
committed
intentionally, the
access to the
whole or any part
of a computer
system without
right. A Party
may require that
the offence be
committed by
infringing
security
measures, with
the intent of
obtaining
computer data or
other dishonest
intent, or in
relation to a
computer system
that is connected
to another
computer system.
[Each party
country shall
adopt domestic
laws] when
committed
intentionally, the

Lithuania Laws
Article 198
Misappropriation
and
Dissemination of
Computer
Information
Article 198-1
Illegal Access to
Computer or to
Network

Finland Laws
Penal Code,
Chapter 38,
Section 8
(Computer
break-in)

Article 198
Misappropriation
and
Dissemination of
Computer
Information

Penal Code,
Chapter 38,
Section 3
(message
interference)
Penal Code,

246. See generally Cybercrime Legislation Country Profile: Finland,
COUNCIL
OF
EUR.
(Feb.
2009),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/co
untryprofiles/cyber_cp_Finland_2009_February.pdf; Cybercrime Legislation
Country Profile: Lithuania, COUNCIL OF EUR. (May 30, 2007),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/co
untryprofiles/cyber_cp_Lithuania_2007_May.pdf.
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Article 4 –
Data
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Article 5 –
System
Interference
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interception
without right,
made by technical
means, of nonpublic
transmissions of
computer data to,
from or within a
computer system,
including
electromagnetic
emissions from a
computer system
carrying such
computer data. A
Party may
require that the
offence be
committed with
dishonest intent,
or in relation to a
computer system
that is connected
to another
computer system.
[Each party
country shall
adopt domestic
laws] when
Committed
intentionally, the
damaging,
deletion,
deterioration,
alteration or
suppression of
computer data
without right.
[Each party
country shall
adopt domestic
laws] the serious
hindering without
right of the

[Vol. 34:2
Chapter 38,
Section 4
(aggravated
message
interference)
Penal Code,
Chapter 38,
Section 8,
paragraph 2

Article 196
Destruction or
Change of
Computer
Information

Penal Code,
Chapter 35,
Section 1
(criminal
damage)

Article 197
Destruction or
Replacement of
Software,
Disruption of the
Operation of

Penal Code,
Chapter 38,
Section 5
(interference)
Penal Code,
Chapter 38,
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Article 11 –
Attempt
and aiding
and
abetting

Article 12 –
Corporate
Liability
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functioning of a
computer system
by inputting,
transmitting,
damaging,
deleting,
deteriorating,
altering or
suppressing
computer data

Computer
Network, Data
bank or
Information
System

Section 7a
(interference
in computer
system)
Penal Code,
Chapter 38,
Section 7b
(aggravated
interference
in computer
system)

[Each party
country shall
adopt domestic
laws] aiding or
abetting the
commission of
any of the
offences
established in
accordance with
Articles 2
through 10 of the
present
Convention with
intent that such
offence be
committed.
1 Each Party
shall adopt such
legislative and
other measures
as may be
necessary to
ensure that legal
persons can be
held liable for a
criminal offence
established in
accordance with
this Convention,
committed for
their benefit by

Article 25
Conspiracy and
Forms of
Conspiracy

Penal Code,
Chapter 5,
Section 5
(instigation)
Penal Code,
Chapter 5,
Section 6
(abetting)

Article 22
Criminal Liability
of Enterprises

Penal Code,
Chapter 9,
Section 1
(scope of
application)
Penal Code,
Chapter 9,
Section 2
(prerequisites
for liability)
Penal Code,
Chapter 9,
Section 3
(connection
offender and
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any natural
person, acting
either
individually or as
part of an organ
of the legal
person, who has a
leading position
within it, based
on:
a. power of
representation of
the legal person;
b. an authority to
take decisions on
behalf of the legal
person;
c an authority to
exercise control
within the legal
person.
2. In addition to
the cases already
provided for in
paragraph 1 of
this article, each
Party shall take
the measures
necessary to
ensure that a
legal person can
be held liable
where the lack of
supervision or
control by a
natural person
referred to in
paragraph 1 has
made possible the
commission of a
criminal offence
established in
accordance with
this Convention

[Vol. 34:2
corporation)
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for the benefit of
that legal person
by a natural
person acting
under its
authority.

Table 2247

Power
Distance

United States

Finland

The US scores a
40. Within
American
organizations,
hierarchy is
established for
convenience,
superiors are
always accessible
and managers
rely on
individual
employees and
teams for their
expertise. Both
managers and
employees expect
to be consulted
and information
is shared
frequently. At
the same time,
communication
is informal,
direct and
participative.

Finland scores a 33
which means that
the following
characterizes the
Finnish style: Being
independent,
hierarchy for
convenience only,
equal rights,
superiors accessible,
coaching leader,
management
facilitates and
empowers. Power is
decentralized and
managers count on
the experience of
their team members.
Employees expect to
be consulted. Control
is disliked and
attitude towards
managers are
informal and on first
name basis.
Communication is
direct and
participative.

Lithuania
45

247. Finland, HOFSTEDE CENTRE, http://geert-hofstede.com/finland.html
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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Masculinity /
Femininity
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The US scores a
91. The
expectation is
that people look
after themselves
and their
immediate
families. There is
also a high
degree of
geographical
mobility in the
United States
and most
Americans are
accustomed to
doing business
with, or
interacting, with
strangers. In the
business world,
employees are
expected to be
self-reliant and
display
initiative.
The US scores a
62. It is
considered a
“masculine”
society. Behavior
in school, work,
and play are
based on the
shared values
that people
should “strive to
be the best they
can be” and that
“the winner
takes all”.
Typically,
Americans “live
to work” so that

[Vol. 34:2

Finland scores a 63.
Individuals are
expected to take care
of themselves and
their immediate
families only. In
individualistic
societies offence
causes guilt and a
loss of self-esteem,
the
employer/employee
relationship is a
contract based on
mutual advantage,
hiring and promotion
decisions are
supposed to be based
on merit only,
management is the
management of
individuals.

50

Finland scores a 26.
It is considered a
feminine society. The
focus is on “working
in order to live”,
managers strive for
consensus, people
value equality,
solidarity and
quality in their
working lives.
Conflicts are
resolved by
compromise and
negotiation.
Incentives such as
free time and
flexibility are

65
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they can earn
monetary
rewards and
attain higher
status based on
how good one can
be. Conflicts are
resolved at the
individual level
and the goal is to
win.
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favored. Focus is on
well-being, status is
not shown.

Table 3—Corruption248
Corruption
Perception
Index
Control of
Corruption

United States
2012:
Rank: 19 /176
Score: 73 /100

Finland
2012:
Rank: 1 /176
Score: 90 /100

Lithuania
2012:
Rank: 48 /176
Score: 54 /100

2010:
Percentile
Rank: 86%
Score:
1.232890271

2010:
Percentile
Rank: 98%
Score:
2.14583654

2010:
Percentile
Rank: 66%
Score:
0.322105477

Table 4—Rule of Law

Rule of
Law

United States
2010:
Percentile
Rank: 91%
Score:
1.584584729

Finland
2010:
Percentile Rank:
100%
Score:
1.971099617

Lithuania
2010:
Percentile
Rank:72%
Score:
0.760096151

248. Corruption
by
Country,
TRANSPARENCY
http://www.transparency.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3

INT’L,
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Table 5—Judicial Independence249

Judicial
Independence

United
States
2011-2012
Rank: 36 /142
Score: 4.9 /7

Finland

Lithuania

2011-2012
Rank: 4 /142
Score: 6.4 /7

2011-2012
Rank: 84 /142
Score: 3.4 /7

249. Id.
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